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LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DRUG TESTING
IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Thomas H. Barnard*
Drug testing, or perhaps more appropriately substance abuse testing, is a
double-edged sword in the private sector. Not only can the employer be sued
as the result of testing but he also can be sued for not testing. Private em-
ployers find themselves in the classic "damned if you do, damned if you
don't" situation. Large corporations are seen as deep pockets when matched
against one of their employees and if the plaintiff's lawyer can find an issue
and then get his or her case to the jury, corporate pockets can be very deep
indeed. Hence, before examining the legal implications of testing, there is
good reason to consider the legal implications of not testing.
I. The Legal Implications of Not Testing
When an employer considers whether or not to test for substance abuse,
primary considerations include questions of productivity, such as absentee-
ism and accidents, or increased costs, such as increased workers' compensa-
tion and benefits. There is recent precedent suggesting that there is legal
support for testing employees or job applicants, or if the private employer
does not test, there is support for instituting a comprehensive substance
abuse control program within the workplace.
A. Third Party Causes of Action
A number of recent decisions hold employers liable for third party claims
arising out of the actions of employees under the influence of drugs or alco-
hol. In Chesterman v. Barmon,' the Oregon Court of Appeals held that an
employer's liability for the criminal actions of an employee who was taking
mescaline and amphetamines was a question for the jury to decide. In two
other recent cases,2 drunk employees were involved in serious automobile
accidents. In both drunk driving cases it is apparent that the employer either
already had knowledge or should have had knowledge that the employee
*Partner in Duvin, Cahn & Barnard, Cleveland, Ohio; LL.B., Columbia Univer-
sity; LL.M., Case Western Reserve University.
82 Or. App. 1, 727 P.2d 130 (1986).
2 Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983); Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co.,
264 Cal. App. 2d 69, 70 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1968), affd on other grounds, 24 Cal. App. 3d 171, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 752 (1972).
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was too drunk to drive and did not take action. In Otis Engineering Corp. v.
Clark, 3 a drunk machine operator sent home by his employer was involved in
an automobile accident en route killing himself and two occupants of another
car. The Texas Supreme Court held the employer liable. In the other case,
Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co.,' the employer was held liable for injuries
suffered by third parties involved in an automobile accident caused by a
drunk employee who left an office Christmas party.
Although not directly addressing the question of testing, these three cases
demonstrate that employers may be held liable for the actions of employees
under the influence of drugs or alcohol. With the proliferation of drug testing
services, it is a small step from knowing a person is "high" by observation to
requiring testing, at least under questionable circumstances.5 For example, if
an employer-defendant testifies that he did not know an employee was un-
der the influence of drugs or had a drinking problem, plaintiff's counsel is
likely to inquire if the employer made an attempt to find out in light of the
employee's suspicious behavior.
Not only have employers been held liable for negligence regarding spe-
cific incidents where the employer had or should have had knowledge of
employee intoxication; employers have been held to be generally knowl-
edgeable of their employees' habits pursuant to a cause of action for negli-
gent hiring. I At least two courts have held employers liable, in the substance
abuse context, under the theory of negligent hiring. In Colwell v. Oatman,7
the employer was held liable for hiring an intoxicated laborer who later in-
jured a fellow employee. In Pittard v. Four Seasons Motor Inn,8 the New Mex-
ico Court of Appeals allowed an employer to be sued for negligence by the
parents of a young boy who was sexually assaulted by an intoxicated hotel
employee.
3 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983).
4 264 Cal. App. 2d 69, 70 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1968).
1 See, e.g., Snitow v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 4815 (Philadelphia C.P. Jan. 30,
1987), noted in 22 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-2 (Feb. 4, 1987) (Three passengers injured in a com-
muter train collision filed a multimillion dollar damage suit against the Southeastern Pennsylva-
nia Transportation Authority (SEPTA) and three operating unions for failing to prevent drug
use by the train crew. Plaintiffs' counsel contends that both the transit agency and the union
should have known that the operators had drug problems and should have cooperated in an
extensive drug testing program.).
6This is a bitter pill for employers to swallow, especially in light of restrictions placed on
employers' inquiries of job applicants, see, e.g., Ohio Pre-employment Inquiry Guide, 3 Empl. Prac.
Guide (CCH) 26,650 (1984).
7 32 Colo. App. 171, 510 P.2d 464 (1973).
6 101 N.M. 723, 688 P.2d 333 (1984).
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B. Injuries to the "High" Employee
Following the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Blankenship v. Cincinnati
Milicron Chemicals, Inc.,' employees may bring intentional tort actions above
and beyond their workers' compensation claims against employers for inju-
ries suffered on the job. In Jones v. V.I.P. Development Co.,"0 the Ohio Su-
preme Court's interpretation of three fact situations enlarged the meaning of
an intentional tort. The court applied a "substantial certainty" test. Subse-
quently enormous numbers of cases were filed by employees whose own
culpability led to their job injury or occupational disease. " For example, in
virtually every occupational disease case handled by the author where respi-
ratory illnesses were alleged, the plaintiff was currently or recently a heavy
tobacco smoker. Neither law nor society defines substance abuse as includ-
ing the use of nicotine. Social mores distinguish nicotine use from alcohol
and marijuana use. However, there is little practical difference in holding an
employer accountable for employee alcohol and marijuana excesses while
disregarding the tobacco excesses of employees.
C. Statutory Liability
In addition to the foregoing employer common law liability, employer
liability also arises for violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(Act)' where employers are not vigilant about employee substance abuse.
While the Act contains no specific standard requiring regulation of sub-
stances on the job, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration can
cite an employer pursuant to the General Duty Clause. 3 Under this provi-
sion an employer can be cited for failing to "furnish to each of his employees
employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized haz-
ards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to
his employees." 4 Permitting an employee to work while intoxicated or un-
der the influence of drugs could be construed as a recognized hazard.
'69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982).
0 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (1985).
" For example, in drunk driving cases like Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.
1983) and Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 264 Cal. App. 2d 69, 70 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1968), an
Ohio employee or his estate might sue an employer for allowing the employee to drive home
drunk claiming that it was substantially certain the employee would kill or injure himself. O-o
REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80 (Baldwin 1986) specifies that an employer retains his common law
defenses. Prior to passage of the new law, however, assertion that an employee's conduct con-
stituted assumption of the risk in a contributory negligence action was impermissible.
12 29 U.S.C. § § 651-678 (1982). See § 654(a)(1) (The General Duty Clause is a catchall provision
used by officials at the Occupational Safety and Health Administration when there is no dear
violation of a specific standard of the Act.)
129 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1982).
14 Id. (emphasis added).
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The foregoing examples of potential legal liability do not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that an employer should engage in substance abuse testing
at the workplace. They do suggest, however, that an employer may suffer
legal and productivity losses without some form of a substance abuse
program. 5
II. Legal Concerns With Testing
The other edge of the sword, of course, is the legal risk an employer faces if
he does test for substance abuse. In general, there is much less risk in the
private sector than in the public sector. There is limited legal risk in testing
job applicants if precautions such as adequate notice of the testing and main-
tenance of confidential test results are taken. 6 Legal issues surface, however,
when employers test current employees.
A. The Union Context
In recent years, either union contracts or rules and regulations promulga-
ted pursuant to those contracts have permitted employers to terminate or
discipline employees for having possession of alcohol or for being intoxi-
cated on the premises. Grievances arise pursuant to union contracts where
employees are disciplined for either the use or possession of alcohol on com-
pany premises during work hours.
There are some changes that have an impact on this common issue arising
under union contracts. First, drug use has increased. Drugs are new and
frightening to employers who had come to expect and tolerate, to a certain
degree, the use of alcohol. Secondly, as the result of employee assistance
programs (EAP), a more sympathetic view of alcohol and drug abuse has
arisen. Substance abuse is generally treated as a disease and the employer
assists in helping the employee's cure. Along with this development has
been a greater leniency on the part of many arbitrators in their treatment of
employees intoxicated or under the influence of drugs on the job. Arbitrators
expect the employer to assist the employee with his problem. Finally, sub-
'5 Manufacturing and transportation employers are particularly vulnerable to liability. Be-
cause of the nature of the jobs, employees are more likely to be exposed to on-the-job hazards
and are in positions more likely to precipitate injuries to other employees or to third parties.
16 But see supra note 6. Cf. Otuo ADmiN. CODE § 4112-5-08 (B)(1)(a) (1984). An employer may
encounter trouble testing a handicapped applicant. In Ohio, employers may make "[ijnquiries
necessary to determine [an] applicant's ability to substantially perform [a] specific job without
significant hazard" but may not make "any other inquiry which would reveal [a] handicap." The
Ohio Civil Rights Commission's Handicap Discrimination Guidelines permit pre-employment
inquires and pre- employment physical examinations "designed to... [d]etermine whether an
applicant can perform the job without significantly increasing the occupational hazards to him-
self or herself, to others, to the general public, or to the work facilities .... "
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stance abuse testing programs are increasingly reliable and relatively inex-
pensive. With the increased availability of testing, not only is the employer
more likely to test; but, in a grievance proceeding, the union may argue that
the employer who did not test made a subjective determination as to
whether the grievant was actually intoxicated. These factors have precipi-
tated an increased interest in the union setting for the implementation of
substance abuse testing programs.
Prior to implementing a drug testing program, the employer has a duty to
negotiate with the union about the program. A drug testing program is a
mandatory subject of bargaining since it affects a condition of employment
within the meaning of section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act. 17 In
some instances, however, the union may waive its rights to bargain about
the subject."
Once a testing program is implemented, it is likely grievances will follow.
There are numerous arbitration cases centered on drug testing problems.1'
While the factors that arbitrators consider in alcohol and drug abuse cases
are similar to those considered in various other types of arbitration cases,
there tends to be a wider disparity of views by arbitrators towards alcohol
and drug abuse. Most arbitrators consider the following factors in arbitra-
tions involving substance abuse:
- The collective bargaining agreement and the work rules upon
which the discipline was based;
- The substantiality of the evidence presented; 2
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1983).
"See, e.g., Concrete Pipe Prods. Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 969, 87 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 601 (1986) (Caraway, Arb.) (The arbitrator found that the company had the right to
implement a drug and alcohol testing policy. The arbitrator stated that implementation of the
policy dearly was an exercise of management rights and an integral part of the company's
responsibility to maintain safety, efficiency and discipline in the work place. He also empha-
sized that the program protected the public from injury which might be inflicted by an intoxi-
cated employee.).
" From March, 1980, through January, 1985, there were 46 cases reported in Labor Arbitra-
tion Reports involving drug- related discharges.
" See, e.g., United States Borax & Chem. Corp. v. Longshoremen's Union Local 30, 84 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 32 (1984) (Richman, Arb.) (the appropriate standard of proof is that of dear and
convincing evidence); A.R.A. Mfg. Co. v. Allied Indus. Workers Local 300,83 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
580 (1984) (Canestraight, Arb.) (reinstatement where employee discharged for alleged posses-
sion and consumption of marijuana on company premises was based on uncorroborated testi-
mony of undercover agent); Amax Chem. Corp. v. international Chem. Workers Local 37, 83
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 635 (1984) (Bell, Arb.) (reinstatement ordered where employer failed to estab-
lish by dear and convincing evidence that discharged employee had control or physical posses-
sion of marijuana found in truck used by other employees as well as grievant).
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- The consistency of the discipline with other similar cases; 21
- The severity of the infraction in relation to the kind of work needed
to be performed; 22 and
- The employee's seniority, attendance, and work performance
records.23
Testing relates directly to issues surrounding work rules, substantiality of
the evidence and consistency. While a comprehensive program may be pref-
erable, at a minimum the contract clause should specify when testing can
occur and the employment-related consequences of a positive test. In Road-
way Express, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 705,214 the collective bargaining agreement
provided that "[tihe [e]mployer may request an [e]mployee to take a medical
test to determine whether he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor
or drugs."-5 The grievant submitted to a drug test following his supervisor's
observations that he was acting in a confused and disoriented manner. The
drug test revealed the presence of marijuana and the employee was dis-
charged. The arbitrator ruled that, although the collective bargaining agree-
ment did not contain an express standard the employer must fulfill before
demanding the drug test, the employer did have an honest and reasonable
suspicion that the employee was under the influence of drugs or alcohol
before asking the employee to submit to the drug test.
There is a similarity between issues arising in the public sector under the
fourth amendmentn and issues arising under union contracts in the private
21 Discharge for on-the-job marijuana possession and/or use but not for employee alcohol
use has led arbitrators to reverse or modify company discipline. See Ethyl Corp. v. Oil Workers
Local 4-16000, 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 953 (1980) (Hart, Arb.); Hooker Chem. Co. v. Niagara Hooker
Employees Union, 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1032 (1980) (Grant, Arb.). But see Issacson Structural Co.
v. International Ass'n of Bridge Workers Local 506, 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1075, 1079 (1979) (Peck,
Arb.) (describing alcoholism as a "disease" subject to treatment and marijuana as a "social drug
used by choice," having no addictive proclivity).
2 See, e.g., Freeman United Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers Local 5134,82 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
861, 865-66 (1984) (Roberts, Arb.) (The arbitrator upheld the discharge for a road grader operator
with a meritorious work record who operated a grader along a heavily traveled road in an
extreme state of intoxication. The arbitrator stated, "[i]rrespective of the Company's leniency
with respect to less serious alcohol related incidents in the past, any Employee must be charged
with knowledge that the operation of dangerous equipment in a state of extreme intoxication is
intolerable and will be dealt with severely.").
21 See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA)2300 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (unblemished disciplinary record of 16 years with airline leads to reinstatement of
airline pilot who was discharged for flying under the influence).
2, 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 224 (1986) (Cooper, Arb.).
Id. at 228.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and efforts, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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sector. One of the problems of testing for substance abuse is that the test
cannot distinguish between the use of a substance while on the job versus
use while off the job. If the contract or rule merely prohibits the use of alcohol
or drugs on the job, the test is unlikely to reveal whether the alcohol/drug use
took place on the premises or before the employee came on duty. The em-
ployer may find himself testing for or controlling a permissible activity un-
dertaken on the employee's own time and off the employer's premises. Arbi-
trators are likely to find that these activities are of no concern to the employer
unless the employer can demonstrate that they damage the company's repu-
tation or product, interfere with the employee's attendance or perform-
ance,7 or result in a fellow employee's refusal, reluctance, or inability to
work with that employee.
Arbitrators also have dealt with the issue of terminating an employee for
refusing to submit to a drug search.2 In Shell Oil Co. v. Oil Workers Union Local
4-3672 and Kraft, Inc. v. Food Workers Local 34,30 arbitrators found grievants to
be insubordinate for refusing to submit to searches where reasonable suspi-
don existed that they were using drugs on the job. Refusal to submit to a test
also could be considered insubordination where the employer reasonably
suspects an employee is under the influence of drugs. In American Standard v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 651 31 the arbitrator suggested that
in the absence of a published rule or policy, an employer cannot terminate an
employee solely for his refusal to take a drug screening test. The arbitrator
upheld that employee's termination because the employee repeatedly refused
to take a drug test after fellow employees' observations that she was under
the influence of drugs. The employer had a policy prohibiting working under
the influence of drugs. The collective bargaining agreement gave the em-
ployer the right to require medical exams at any time to determine the em-
ployee's "fitness to work. "3 The arbitrator concluded that observations of
2 See, e.g., APCOA, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 449 (1983)
(Hewitt, Arb.) (arbitrator upheld the termination of a valet driver who, having received warn-
ings, reported to work smelling of alcohol in unfit condition for work in violation of company
rules); but see Texas Utils. Generating Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 2337, 82
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 6 (1983) (Edes, Arb.) (arbitrator found employer had no authority to require
grievant to take test to determine marijuana use when the employee was off company prem-
ises).
2 See Shell Oil Co. v. Oil Workers Union Local 4-367,84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 562 (1985) (Milentz,
Arb.); Kraft, Inc. v. Food Workers Local 34, 82 Lab. Arb. 360 (1984) (Denson, Arb.).
- 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 562 (1985) (Milentz, Arb.).
- 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 360 (1984) (Denson, Arb.).
M 77 Lab Arb. (BNA) 1085 (1981) (Katz, Arb.).
' Id. at 1087 (emphasis added).
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the grievant's apparently intoxicated condition coupled with her refusal
to submit to the medical test in light of published and posted company policy
justified the grievant's discharge.
In January, 1987, the United States Supreme Court agreed to review
Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers International Union.3 In Misco, the Supreme
Court will address the question of whether public policy warrants a federal
court reversing an arbitration award.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's de-
termination that the arbitrator's award of reinstatement and back pay to an
employee fired for smoking marijuana contravened "well defined public pol-
icy - the Louisana law against possession of marijuana"3 and public policy
"against the operation of dangerous machinery by persons under the influ-
ence of drugs or alcohol."1
While the Court may defer to the decision of the arbitrator, in light of
"federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration,"3 the Misco case
gives the Court a vehicle by which it may comment on substance abuse in the
workplace.
C. Handicap Discrimination
An employer must be cognizant of federal and state handicap discrimina-
tion laws when undertaking drug testing.
1. Federal Law
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973,1 generally prohibits employment discrim-
ination against handicapped persons who are employees of or applicants for
employment with federal contractors.- Although a "handicapped individ-
ual" for purposes of this statute has been broadly interpreted by the courts,
subsequent amendment has narrowed the statute's coverage. In 1978, a dis-
trict court in Pennsylvania held that three employees who were former her-
33768 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, - U.S. - , 107 S. Ct. 871 (1987).
1 Id. at 741.
a Id. at 743.
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). See also United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkersv. Warrior & Gulf Naviga-
tion Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (the three cases comprise the so-called Steelworkers Trilogy).
29 U.S.C. §§ 701-774 (1982).
Handicapped employees do not have direct causes of action against employers if the em-
ployer is a government contractor. Employees must file a charge of discrimination with the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs which files administrative complaints where
apropriate. See 29 U.SC. § 793(b) (1982).
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oin addicts on a methadone program were "handicapped individuals"
within the statutory definition.3 However, the Rehabilitation Act's defini-
tion of a "handicapped individual" was amended in the same year to exclude
from coverage:
any individual who is an alcohol or drug abuser whose current
use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from performing
the duties of the job in question or whose employment, by reason
of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a direct
threat to property or the safety of others.4'
The foregoing amendment, however, does not preclude drug addiction
and alcoholism from being considered handicaps under certain circum-
stances.4 ' Some courts have held that former addicts are handicapped be-
cause they have a past record of an impairment within the meaning of the
Rehabilitation Act. One court suggested in dictum that current addicts under
some circumstances could be considered handicapped. "[C]ertainly Con-
gress intended to include an individual with a history of drug abuse as 'hand-
icapped'.., where the drug addiction substantially affects the addict's abil-
ity to perform a major life activity."4
While former addicts who may be deemed to have a record of substantial
impairment of a major life activity are handicapped within the meaning of
the Act,43 former addicts and/or recovering alcoholics are something quite
different from the current abuser. Hence, the Rehabilitation Act does not
appear to preclude testing. Testing would not, under most ordinary circum-
stances, reveal the use of alcohol or illegal drugs from the past, but testing
would disclose current use and therefore falls squarely Within the exception
provided by the 1978 amendment.
2. State Law
State laws governing handicap discrimination widely vary on whether
alcoholism and drug addiction are covered handicaps. Three states, Wiscon-
sin, Montana and Ohio, hold that current addicts and alcoholics are cov-
Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
'329 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
"See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568,581 (1979) (The "language of
the statute, even after its amendment, is not free of ambiguity.").
42McCleod v. Detroit, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 225, 228 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (dictum).
' Simson v. Reynolds Metal Co., 629 F.2d 1226,1231 n.8 (7th Cir. 1980) (dictum) (employees
with prior history of drug addiction are handicapped); Johnson v. Smith, 39 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1106, 1108 (Minn. 1985); cf. Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791, 796 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(stating in pertinent part "it is not surprising that Congress would wish to provide assistance for
those who have overcome their addiction").
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ered." Two states, Iowa and Illinois," hold that recovering alcoholics are
handicapped. In several states there are statutes, cases or opinions that drug
addiction and alcoholism are not handicaps. Texas and California specifically
provide this in their respective codes.46
Even in states where alcoholics and drug abusers are considered handi-
capped and protected as such, there are limits to the protection afforded. In
Coleman v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,' the Commission stated that although
alcoholism is a protected handicap, where the complainant admitted to
drinking a pint of alcohol a day and admitted there was a connection between
his drinking and attendance/performance problems on the job, the com-
plainant's discharge was held not unlawful. In Hubbard v. United Press Inter-
national, Inc.,48 an award-winning news photographer, a known alcoholic,
was held lawfully dismissed for poor news judgment, lack of aggressiveness
in serving clients and failure to coordinate with newsside. Similarly in Squires
v. Labor and Industry Review Commission," the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
held that an alcoholic employee must still satisfy job standards set by an
employer.
Perhaps the most far-reaching state case to date is Hazlett v. Martin Chevro-
let, Inc..S" In Hazlett the Ohio Supreme Court not only held that drug addic-
tion and alcoholism are handicaps under Ohio law but went on to state that
drug addicts and alcoholics must be accommodated in the same manner as
persons with other medical handicaps. Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme
Court acknowledged that an individual who is unable to perform his respon-
sibilities may be discharged.
The facts in Hazlett helped the plaintiff/employee. Hazlett was terminated
when he took the initiative to seek a twenty-eight day leave for treatment of
his alcohol and cocaine addiction. The decision raises the question of
"See Hazlett v. Martin Chevrolet, Inc., 25 Ohio St. 3d 279, 496 N.E.2d 478 (1986); Connecti-
cut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 86 Wis. 2d 393, 273
N.W.2d 206 (1979); American Indian Action Council, Case No. 288, (Mont. Comm'n for Human
Rights 1976) (final order).
"See Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Cedar Rapids Civil Rights Comm'n, 37 EmpI. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 35,297 (Iowa 1985); Athanas v. Board of Educ., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 569
(N.D. 111. 1980).
4TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 2.01(7)(A) (Vernon 1987); CAL. ADMN. CODE tit. 2, §
7293.6(a)(4)(19-.). See also 63 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 408 (1978) (stating that drug addiction does not
constitute a physical or mental handicap).
10 IM. Reg. 2 (Human Rights Comm'n 1983).
330 N.W.2d 428, 443 (Minn. 1983).
97 Wis. 2d 648, 294 N.W.2d 48 (1980).
"25 Ohio St. 3d 279, 496 N.E.2d 478 (1986).
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whether the court would have been as sympathetic toward the plaintiff had
he not sought treatment but had been detected as a drug addict or alcoholic
or if his job performance resulted in a problem.
Notwithstanding the distinction between the employee who seeks treat-
ment and the employee who is detected to be a substance abuser, most state
statutes and the federal statute provide that handicapped individuals must
be accommodated. This does not foreclose testing, but it does raise questions
about what the employer should or should not do when it is determined the
employee has a substance abuse problem, even if the problem has no ob-
vious impact on his work.
D. Common Law Actions
With the change of presidential administrations and philosophies in 1980,
the battleground between employees and employers shifted from the federal
to the state courts. In the last seven years a rapid expansion of state common
law claims brought by employees against their employers has occurred. The
most prominent of these claims is "wrongful discharge." Others include def-
amation, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, and assault
and battery. Each of these claims may arise as a result of drug testing.
1. Wrongful Discharge.
In Ohio, the law regarding wrongful discharge is unsettled. Ohio recog-
nizes a cause of action for wrongful discharge arising out of an implied con-
tract and promissory estoppel. 51 But the Ohio Supreme Court rejected a
wrongful discharge cause of action for a violation of public policy. This is
relevant to substance abuse testing, because an employer who does not fol-
low company policy on substance abuse testing is vulnerable to a wrongful
discharge suit. Where a substance abuse testing policy is set forth in writing,
it is imperative that it be followed. One may avoid such a lawsuit by attaching
a disclaimer to the policy stating that it is a guideline and does not establish a
contract between the employer and employee. This approach followed with
reinforcing company handbooks is one method by which an employer might
avoid a lawsuit by non-unionized employees at will.n3
A wrongful discharge cause of action for violation of public policy is less
likely than a wrongful discharge based on a contract claim. The employee
51 Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 483 N.E.2d 150 (1985).
52 Phung v. Waste Mgmt., 23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 491 N.E.2d 1114 (1986).
1 See, e.g., Dellv. Montgomery Ward, 811 F.2d 970 (6thCir. 1987) (court rejected the claim of
a former employee who signed an express statement that his employment was for no definite
period and could be terminated at any time).
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must identify the public policy violated. Public policy arguably favors drug
testing. Testing protects the general public and other employees from poten-
tial injury.
In states where polygraph testing is prohibited, and the employer uses a
polygraph to determine whether the employee is abusing alcohol or drugs,
the employer is vulnerable to a lawsuit. For example in Perks v. Firestone
Rubber Co., 4 the court held that a cause of action for tortious discharge ex-
isted where the plaintiff's termination resulted from a refusal to submit to a
polygraph exam. The federal court specifically noted that Pennsylvania law
prohibits employers from requiring employees to take polygraph tests. Simi-
larly in Leibowitz v. H.A. Winston Co.,- a Pennsylvania state judge submitted
the polygraph issue to a jury.5
In states where there are no statutes prohibiting the use of polygraph
tests, wrongful discharge claims have been denied. In Todd v. South Carolina
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.,5 the court denied a wrongful discharge
claim when the company terminated the plaintiff for refusal to take a poly-
graph test. The court held that "in the absence of a statute barring polygraph
tests as a condition for hiring or continuation of employment, we find the
appellants' actions in terminating Todd consonant with the public policy of
this state."58
Unless the state has an identifiable statute or explicit public policy relative
to testing, it is unlikely that a wrongful discharge cause of action would arise
for violation of public policy.
2. Defamation
A private employer's greatest exposure to potential lawsuits against pri-
vate employees arises when test results are disclosed. In Houston Belt & Ter-
minal Railway Co. v. Wherry,0 a former employee was awarded $200,000 in
damages where the employer falsely reported the employee was a drug user
and based the report on incomplete test results. A doctor reported "DRUG
SCREEN METHADONE POSITIVE... trace" and suggested during a tele-
phone call that "it might be investigated further." A written report was circu-
- 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979).
m 342 Pa. Super. 111, 493 A.2d 111 (1985).
" See also Molush v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Pa. 1982); State v.
Community Distribs., Inc., 64 N.J. 479, 317 A.2d 697 (1974); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 7321(a)
(Purdon 1983).
5 283 S.C. 155, 321 S.E.2d 602 (1984), modified, 287 S.C. 190, 336 S.E.2d 472 (1985).
Id. at - , 321 S.E.2d at 613.
548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 962 (1977).
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lated to seven officials in the railway system and finally utilized in a hearing
before a Public Law Board pursuant to the Railway Labor Act. The report was
false. A subsequent report revealed that the substance detected as metha-
done was'not methadone at all but a substance which gave a similar re-
sponse. These facts removed the employer's case out of the qualified privi-
lege, protecting internal communications and supported a finding of malice
by the court.
The best defense to a defamation action is the truth. In Rosemond v. Na-
tional Railroad Passenger Corp.,60 a summary judgment was granted in favor of
an employer who reported in newspapers that marijuana was detected in an
employee's blood following the employee's involvement in an on-the-job
accident. The employee lost his defamation lawsuit because he admitted it
was true that he had traces of marijuana in his blood.
Notwithstanding Rosemond, an employer is flirting with a lawsuit anytime
a report on the results of testing is made to any person not having a need to
know. Considering the attitude towards drugs in our society, a false report
on drug abuse, may be construed as defamation per se.
In Ohio, there is an additional incentive to the employer to assure accu-
racy of test results. A statute provides the employee, upon written request,
with the right to see his medical records. 6' Employers in Ohio have a statu-
tory duty to make test results available to the employee. The statute provides
access to important information for any employee suing an employer for
defamation following disclosure of drug test results.
3. Common Law Right To Privacy
The private employer is not vulnerable to assertions of violations of the
right to privacy to the extent that a public employer is vulnerable. Public
employer claims usually arise out of the federal Constitution and/or state
constitutional protections. Nonetheless, federal constitutional guarantees of
privacy form the basis for state common law tort causes of action.
In K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trottij 2 for example, the Texas Court of
Appeals held that an employee who used her own lock on a company locker
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the locker. Accordingly a search
not based on any reasonable suspicion violated her common law right to
privacy. In another case, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local
60 No. 85 Civ. 5661 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1986).
61 OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 4113.23 (Baldwin 1986).
677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
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1900 v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 63 the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit categorized random testing of employees for drugs as an "hysterical"
invasion of privacy."
The use of polygraphs poses the greatest risk to actual liability for invasion
of privacy. In O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of America, Inc., 6 an employee was re-
quired to take a polygraph test when it was suspected he was using drugs
away from the workplace. He alleged that he was required to answer ques-
tions unrelated to his employment in the examination. The Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit held that the company violated the employee's common
law right of privacy, notwithstanding the company's policy prohibiting drug
use. The jury awarded the plaintiff/employee $450,000.
A case involving a urinanysis led to a different result. In Satterfield v. Lock-
heed Missiles and Space Co.,6 a summary judgment was granted in favor of the
employer where the employee resigned after a drug test revealed the pres-
ence of marijuana in his urine. The court noted that the employer did not
inform the general public of the test results nor did it publicize that the em-
ployee had been terminated because of the drug test and therefore there was
no invasion of privacy.
4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Satterfield, the plaintiff alleged intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress in addition to a violation of privacy. The employer's conduct was not
found to be "so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all possible bounds of
decency."67 The court emphasized that the employer allowed the employee
to tender his resignation rather than be terminated and that the employer
investigated the employee's concerns about the validity of the test.
A recent Minnesota case, however, found an employer liable for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress resulting from an unreasonable
search.6 1 The employee recovered a jury award of $60,000 for emotional in-
jury resulting from a polygraph test administered by her employer in viola-
tion of Minnesota law. The plaintiff testified that she had nightmares after
taking the polygraph exam. The case involved neither drugs nor alcohol but
involved the accusation of theft.
63634 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C. 1986).
-Id. (dictum).
11 780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1986).
66 617 F. Supp. 1359 (D.S.C. 1985).
Id. at 1366.
Kamrath v. Suburban Nat'l Bank, 363 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
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5. Assault and Battery
In general, any nonconsented touching can give rise to a potential lawsuit
for battery. A surgeon, for example, may be liable for battery if he performs
an operation without the patient's consent.6 Similarly, in the employment
context, a battery claim could arise if blood were taken and tested without the
donor's consent. However, the employee must be competent to consent to a
test. An intoxicated person may not be deemed competent to consent.'
III. Employer's Checklist
The private employer who decides to implement a testing program is sus-
ceptible to minimal risk of employee lawsuits if the employer uses a modi-
cum of good judgment in establishing and administering it. Following is a
check list employers should consider before implementing a program.
1. What is the purpose of the program? Is it safety to the employees or
the public? Is it to increase production? Or is the employer imple-
menting the program because everyone else is?
2. Who is to be covered by the program? Is it drivers or operators of
dangerous equipment, i.e., the so called "critical jobs?" Is it to be
extended to all plant and production employees? Is it to extend to
managers and supervisors and sales people?" Will the program in-
clude participants in the so-called two martini lunch where the
salesman or manager subsequently drives a motor vehicle or will it
be limited to the machine operator who has a can of beer for lunch?
3. What substances are to be covered? In today's world, testing for drugs
and not alcohol is a mistake. Alcohol simply is another drug, a sub-
stance subject to abuse. The potential abuse of prescription drugs
should also be considered. In a drug testing program the employee
or person being tested should be asked which prescription drugs he
or she takes and in what dosages. While prescription drugs may be
beneficial in proper dosages, it is well recognized that in excess do-
sages some can be habit forming and as dangerous as illegal drugs.
See Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956).
See, e.g., Hollerud v. Malamis, 20 Mich. App. 748, 174 N.W.2d 626 (1969).
71 According to a recent survey of vice presidents and personnel directors of large com-
panies, it is estimated that 26.4% of U.S. executives drink during a typical lunch today. (This is
down from 37.7% five years ago.) Ideas & Trends, HumAN REsouRcE MGMr., Feb. 20, 1987, at 26.
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4. Prohibited conduct should be clearly described by including use, pos-
session and sale of the substance on company premises. The mean-
ing of premises should be precisely defined. Consideration must be
given to parking lots and/or other property adjacent to the company
and to employees conducting company business off company prop-
erty.
5. Notice to employees is crucial to compliance. Notice must be clear.
The policy must include provisions protecting employee privacy in
taking the test and dissemination of results. "Under the Influence"
should be defined. This is crucial because it gives notice to em-
ployees and provides consistency in the enforcement of rules. In
arriving at such a definition, a professional should be consulted to
make certain that the line is drawn at a reasonable place.
The usual policy would not prohibit the use of alcohol or drugs
away from the employer's premises. However, an employee might
become intoxicated at home, come to work and thereby seriously
impair his work performance and the safety of other employees and
the public. A standard which applies to conduct off premises which
leads to poor performance or safety risks on premises should be
considered.
6. Supervisory training should be implemented. Supervisors are the em-
ployees most likely to recognize employee behavior leading to the
reasonable suspicion which justifies testing. Supervisors should be
well-trained. They also should be fully acquainted with the policy
and its administration. Further, supervisors should be cautioned to
apply the program consistently.
TV. Conclusion
Substance abuse testing has captured the attention of industry today. The
abuse is not new. The apprehension of offenders is not going to be a panacea
for the ills of American industry. Nonetheless, it is well-documented that
drug and alcohol abuse seriously impede efficiency and pose substantial haz-
ards to other employees and to the general public. It is prudent for the private
employer to implement a substance abuse program. Testing, also should be
considered. The most effective program is one which is combined with an
employee assistance program, where the employer is willing to provide help
to the employee who admits to his or her substance abuse problem. It is
imperative that employers make it clear that there is no place in the enter-
prise for employees risking health and safety through drug and alcohol
abuse.
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